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Evaluating the Impact of Crime on Tourism in Barbados: 
A Transfer Function Approach  
 
 
 
The impact of crime on tourism to Barbados was examined using a transfer function approach. 
Results indicate that an increase in the overall crime rate has a negative and significant impact on 
arrivals to the island, and the fall-off is delayed, starting 6 months after a one-unit increase in the 
crime rate. The impulse response function shows that a 1% shock to crime reduces arrivals to 
Barbados, but takes about 20 months for arrivals to return to normalcy. This results in direct 
income losses of US$47,000 and indirect losses of US$108,000. Impacts for murder, assault with 
intent to rob, rape, and residential burglary rates were also investigated. Qualitatively, the results 
resemble those for the overall crime rate; however, the magnitudes of the impacts are greater and 
income losses are generally in the millions. Given the country’s dependence on tourism receipts 
to sustain its current account, shocks to the crime rate can lead to balance of payment problems. 
Since there is a lag before the impact of increases in crime takes its full toll on arrivals, it is advised 
that at the first sign of heightened criminal activity policy makers should act to minimize losses. 
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1. Introduction 
In choosing a destination, most individuals are influenced by their perceptions or knowledge of 
the destination.  As tourism is a discretionary product, the majority of tourists will not go to a 
destination where their safety and well-being may be in jeopardy (Pizam & Mansfeld, 1996).  
Crime against tourists, particularly murder, is quickly picked up by regional and international 
media and can have both an immediate impact in terms of cancellations and the issuance of travel 
advisories and a long-term impact.  It takes both a sufficient passage of time and a significant 
promotional effort to persuade tourists to return to destinations that are widely seen as unsafe. 
Much evidence exists which highly suggests that safety is a necessary condition for a 
thriving tourism industry.  In a survey conducted by Brunt, Mawby & Hambly (2000), 42 percent 
of respondents noted that they had ruled out travelling to at least one country/area because of 
dangers such as crime, terrorism or threatening behaviour.  Nkosi (2010) found that individuals 
did not visit facilities in KwaZulu-Natal which had a history of crime.  Studies by Shiebler, Crotta 
& Hollinger (1996) and Brayshaw (1995) indicated that attacks on tourists in Florida in 1992 led 
to a significant decline in tourism.  Similar fallouts were reported for acts of terrorism in Europe 
(Brady & Widdows, 1988), political instability in China (Gartner & Shen, 1992) and the 9/11 
terrorist attacks which led to a worldwide decline in travel. 
Faced with a relatively high chance of becoming victims of crime in a particular 
destination, tourists delay or even completely alter their plans.  Indeed, the perception of the crime 
rate in a destination has a significant influence on international travel (Park & Reisinger, 2008). 
This poses a challenge for policy makers, particularly those in tourism-dependent states; they must 
understand how tourists respond to threats, real or perceived, to their safety.  If policy makers do 
not properly include crime-related costs in the tourism cost-benefit calculus, there is a risk of 
under-investment in suitable infrastructure, programmes and technologies that would ensure the 
safety of visitors.  Unchecked crime against tourists will have adverse effects on the tourist 
experience and can encourage enclave tourism developments (de Albuquerque & McElroy, 1999).   
Barbados is considered a relatively safe destination (World Economic Forum, 2011).  The 
country is politically stable, natural disasters such as earthquakes and tsunamis are extremely rare 
and the probability of acts of terrorism is miniscule.  Nevertheless, there have been reported 
incidences of crime against tourists.  Such incidents have risen in recent years, from an average of 
13 incidents per month in 2005 to about 22 incidents per month in 2008, an increase of 69 percent.  
As a proportion of total crime, incidents against visitors rose from 1.8 percent to 2.9 percent.  
Travel advisories by the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA) and 
Canada—the top three international source markets for Barbados—warn their citizens against 
walking alone in isolated areas, especially after dark, carrying large amounts of cash or jewellery 
and to lock and secure hotel rooms and rental home doors and windows.   
This study evaluates the response of long-stay tourists to crime in Barbados.  Barbados 
provides an interesting case study, as its economic fortunes are closely tied to its tourism industry.  
Developments in economic growth generally conform to the trends in international tourism.  
Tourism satellite accounting by the World Travel and Tourism Council estimates that tourism’s 
total contribution to Barbados’ employment and gross domestic product is above 45 percent, 
identifying Barbados as one of the top 20 most tourism-dependent countries in the world.  Like 
most Small Island Developing States and Territories, (SIDST), Barbados lacks an abundance of 
natural resources to competitively engage in international goods trade. Thus, tourism has emerged 
as the main source of foreign exchange, accounting for nearly 50 percent of foreign earnings on 
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average.  Further, current account deficits in Barbados would be unsustainable without the earnings 
from tourism (Lorde, Lowe, & Francis, 2010).   
To meet the objectives of this study, the authors utilise monthly data and a transfer function 
as in Enders, Sandler & Parise (1992).  The main advantage of this approach is that it allows the 
authors to track the immediate and delayed impacts of crime on tourism.  Understanding the 
relationship between crime and tourism is imperative, as effective management of social problems 
in general and crime in particular, requires considerable information about the nature of the 
problem and the range of its effects on the tourism sector.   
 
 
2. Brief Review of the Literature 
Tourism is irrevocably bound up with the concept of safety.  Based on the theory of consumer 
demand by Lancaster (1971), tourists consume certain characteristics of their destination, rather 
than a single good.  Unless the characteristics are unique to the destination, tourists can easily 
switch to another destination when faced with threats to their safety.  Thus, a country can find its 
tourism industry vulnerable to threats, such as crime, as tourists can easily visit another country 
with similar characteristics, but which are much safer. 
While it is widely recognised that safety is a critical factor in tourists’ destination choice 
process, it is only recently that this issue has gained much scholarly attention.  The significant rise 
in the tourism-safety literature came at the turn of the 21st century due to a multiplicity of 
international events including: terrorism attacks (for example, USA, 2001; Bali, 2002; Jakarta, 
2003; Madrid, 2004; London, 2005;Egypt, 2006); natural disasters such as tsunamis (for example, 
Indonesia/Sri Lanka/India/Thailand; 2004;1 Japan, 2011); and health scares (for example, foot and 
mouth, 2001;bird flu, 2003; SARS, 2003-2004; swine flu, 2009-2010). 
As of late, a less researched area in the tourism-safety literature, relates to the impact of 
crime on tourism.  This is noteworthy, since the actual risk of terrorism, health outbreak or natural 
disaster is low in comparison to the risk of being victimised when on holiday.   One possible 
explanation could be that though rare, crisis events have a fairly immediate and dramatic impact 
on tourism (see for instance, Dwyer, Forsyth, Spurr, & VanHo, 2006; Eugenio-Martin, Sinclair, & 
Yeoman, 2006) and in many cases, the event is not limited to the wounded country alone; there 
are often spillover effects on surrounding destinations (Drakos & Kutan, 2003).  As noted by 
Dimanche & Lepetic (1999), “a crime situation, unlike other crises that break at specific time such 
as an earthquake, riots or acts of terrorism, pervades the industry by slowly affecting the image of 
destination and by changing people’s perceptions.”  Moreover, a high crime rate in one country is 
less likely to impact the image of countries in the neighbouring region.  
Despite the relatively small impact of crime on tourism relative to crisis events, it is 
generally accepted that a high-crime image can be detrimental to a destination.  But the extent of 
the actual impact of crime is generally debated, as this is largely contingent on tourists’ knowledge 
of a destination (Levantis & Gani, 2000).  The latter argue that there is an inevitable degree of 
information asymmetry in terms of destinations’ safety levels, as several may not publish accurate 
and comparable statistics or other information explaining the severity of crime.  This suggests that 
in areas in which criminal activities are well-publicised the relationship between expected tourism 
and crime may be more profound. 
                                               
1 These were the four worst countries affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. The others affected were Somalia, 
Myanmar, Maldives, Malaysia, Tanzania, Seychelles, Bangladesh, South Africa, Yemen, Kenya and Madagascar. 
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Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the empirical literature has produced mixed 
results on the significance of crime on tourism demand.  For instance, using annual data, Levantis 
& Gani (2000) estimate simple country-specific ordinary least squares (OLS) models of the crime-
tourism relationship for eight SIDST—the Bahamas, Barbados, Fiji, Jamaica, Papua-New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands, Trinidad & Tobago and Tonga.  It was found that with the exception of the 
Solomon Islands, increased crime acts a hindrance to demand for tourism in these islands.  The 
authors posit that the finding for Solomon Islands could largely be due to poor feedback to source 
nations of developments in safety levels in the country.   
Another explanation for differing results could be due to the fact that in some destinations, 
the tourism product may involve more community interactions than others.  Some tourist 
destinations largely consist of all-inclusive hotels, which limit local interactions, and by extension, 
crime against tourists. Looking specifically at the case of Jamaica, Alleyne & Boxill (2003) 
discovered that crime has a severe impact on arrivals from the European market.  In contrast, 
visitors from the US seem to be unaffected by criminal activity in Jamaica.  As explained by the 
authors, tourists from Europe tend to gravitate towards smaller, more intimate hotels with greater 
interaction with the community.  Tourists staying in such areas are more likely to be victimised 
than tourists lodging at all-inclusive hotels.   
It is also possible that there is some difference in the response of tourists to different types 
of crime.  For example, Altindag (2009) found that violent crimes such as homicide and assault 
are negatively associated with the volume of international tourists while crimes such as theft, 
burglary and property crimes have no impact on tourism in Europe.  Pizam (1999) suggests that 
violent crimes have more of a lasting effect than theft crimes as they are, at times, life altering and 
can be more devastating to a victim than theft.  Moreover, violent incidences such as murder or 
rape tend to generate more media attention than say theft and thus are likely to have more damaging 
effects on the perception of the destination. 
The available evidence indicates that the extent of crime on tourism depends largely on the 
publicity given to criminal activities, the amount of interaction with locals and the type of crime 
in the destination.  In what follows, the authors focus exclusively on the impact of crime on arrivals 
to Barbados.   
While the studies reviewed provide some evidence on the relationship between crime and 
tourism, these approaches, with the exception of Alleyne & Boxill (2003), do not consider the 
possible dynamic nature of the relationship.  By employing a transfer function, this study explicitly 
considers this possibility.  Like previous studies, the response of tourist arrivals to different types 
of crime and from different source markets is assessed.  Unlike previous studies, the time taken 
for arrivals to return to “normalcy” after a spike (shock) in crime is estimated.  The final point of 
departure is that cumulative losses in tourism receipts after a spike are also quantified. 
 
 
3. Data and Estimation Technique 
The aim of this paper is to provide numerical estimates of the impact of crime on tourism in 
Barbados. To accomplish this task, the study employs a transfer function as outlined in Enders et 
al (1992).  The function may be written as: 
 
 𝑨𝒓𝒓𝒕 = 𝝕𝟎 + 𝑨(𝑳)𝑨𝒓𝒓𝒕+𝟏 + 𝑪(𝑳)𝒁𝒕 + 𝑩(𝑳)𝜺𝒕            (1) 
where 𝐴𝑟𝑟3 is monthly deseasonalised tourist arrivals to Barbados in period t; 𝑍3is the monthly 
crime rate in period t; and A(L), B(L), and C(L) are polynomials in the lag operator L.  The 
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polynomial C(L) is called the transfer function in that it shows how a movement in the exogenous 
variable 𝑍3 affects the time path of the endogenous variable 𝐴𝑟𝑟3.  The coefficient 𝑐6 shows the 
immediate impact of criminal activities on tourist arrivals, while the subsequent coefficients reflect 
the delayed effects.  If the first n lagged values of 𝑍3 are insignificant, there is an n period lag in 
the effects of crime on tourism.  
The procedure for fitting the transfer function consists of various steps and in each stage, 
the standard Box-Jenkins methodology is used to fit the model and the Schwarz Bayesian and 
Akaike Information Criteria are used to choose between possible models.  The steps can be 
summarised as follows.  First, an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model of the 𝑍3 
sequence is fitted.  Second, the 𝐴𝑟𝑟3 series is then pre-whitened using the model in the previous 
step and the cross correlograms between the two series are analysed and used as a guide in 
identifying the form of A(L) and C(L).  Third, the “best” fitting model is used to estimate the 
preliminary model: [𝟏 − 𝒂(𝑳)𝑳]𝑨𝒓𝒓𝒕 = 𝑪(𝑳)𝒁𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕                         (2) 
where 𝜀3 denotes an error term which may not be white noise.  Fourth, the autocorrelation function 
of the {𝜀3} sequence obtained in the previous step is used to find the appropriate form of 𝐵(𝐿)𝜀3.  
Finally, steps 3 and 4 are then combined to estimate the full equation.  The estimated model should 
be parsimonious (that is, only significant terms are retained) and the residuals white noise. 
From the broad categories reviewed in the previous section, several individual crime rates 
are selected for analysis, namely, Murder, Rape, Assault with Intent to Rob, and 
Residential/Accommodation Burglary; Total Crime is also investigated.  It is expected that violent 
crime will have a greater impact than non-violent crime. 
Observations on crime were collected from the statistical unit of the Royal Barbados Police 
Force with the special permission of the Commissioner of Police, while those for long-stay visitor 
arrivals were obtained from the Caribbean Tourism Organisation.  A caveat is that monthly 
observations on crime against tourists are only available from 2005-2008, which is much too brief 
for our empirical purposes.   Consequently crime rates in the overall population, that is, for both 
locals and tourists combined, from 1999M1-2008M12 are employed.  This is unlikely to cause 
significant measurement bias in our view as we believe that tourists’ perceptions and associated 
response are based on the overall climate of crime in a destination; that is, whether it is a low- 
versus high-crime destination, or whether there is a spike in overall crime.  The obvious exception 
would be in cases where visitors are targeted disproportionately to locals.  At any rate, focussing 
on reported crime against visitors only would likely understate their true risk of victimisation and 
consequently estimates of their response.  
 
 
4. Results 
As a preliminary step, the order of integration for all variables must be determined, as estimation 
of transfer functions requires that the underlying variables be stationary, I(0), to avoid spurious 
results.  This is accomplished using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey & Fuller 1979; 1981) 
and the Phillips-Perron (Phillips & Perron, 1988) tests.  Results (available on request) indicate that 
all variables are I(0). 
The results from the transfer functions are presented in Table 1 (p-values are given in 
parentheses). Looking first at the temporal properties, the estimations suggest that all 
specifications have two autoregressive terms (Arrt-1 and Arrt-2) and their coefficients are all 
positive.  We find no evidence that moving average terms should be included.  The Q-statistics 
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indicate that the residuals are white noise and all terms are significant suggesting that the models 
are well-specified. 
We turn now to the impact of crime on arrivals (given by the coefficients of the Z terms).  
The first column of Table 1 presents the reaction of arrivals to changes in Total Crime rate in 
Barbados.  Estimates indicate that an increase in the rate of crime has a negative and significant 
impact on arrivals. The transfer function also suggests that there is a lag in the tourism-crime 
relationship.2  Specifically, an increase in Total Crime rate only starts to affect tourist arrivals after 
three months (evidenced by the fact that only the Zt-3 term was found to be statistically significant).  
This moderate lag is not unexpected, as it may take some time for tourists to revise their travel 
plans.    
As noted in the literature review, it is quite possible that tourists may react differently to 
different types of crime.  Hence, the authors disaggregate total crime by type and again utilise the 
transfer function approach, this time to study the impact of the differing types of crime on tourist 
arrivals to Barbados.  This is shown in the remaining columns of Table 1.   
It should be noted that there are some interesting features that the estimations have in 
common.  For example, the rates of Murder, Assault with Intent to Rob, Rape and 
Residential/Accommodation Burglary all have a negative and significant impact on tourism (based 
on the coefficients of the Z terms),  but there are some differences.  Of particular note, the 
magnitude of responses and time taken before a response occurs differ.  The transfer functions 
indicate a three-period lag in the response of tourists to Murder, a two-period lag for 
Residential/Accommodation Burglary and a one-period lag for Rape, while the reaction to Assault 
with Intent to Rob is immediate.  The coefficients of the Z terms suggest that there is a fall-off of 
735 potential tourists for every one unit increase in the Assault with Intent to Rob rate; for the 
Murder rate, approximately 682 tourists; in the case of the Rape rate, 397 tourists; and finally, for 
the Residential/Accommodation Burglary rate, about 46 tourists. 
We take the analysis a step further and also investigate the dynamic effects of a shock to 
Total Crime on tourism. Hence, the transfer function is modified to produce an impulse-response 
function, similar to the standard vector autoregression (VAR) analyses.  Details of this approach 
can be found in Enders et al. (1992).   
The dynamic effects of crime on tourism are displayed in Figure 1. Looking first at the 
impact of the Total Crime rate, the impulse response shows that a shock to this variable 
significantly reduces visitors to Barbados.  But, since the Total Crime rate transfer function has an 
autoregressive term, the system has memory regarding criminal activity (see Enders et al, 1992).  
Hence, it takes some time for the effect to dissipate and for arrivals to eventually return to their 
pre-shock level.  Specifically, after a shock to Total Crime, it takes about 30 months for arrivals 
to return to normalcy (see Table 2).   
We also estimate the impulse functions for specific types of crime (also shown in Figure 
1).  The impulse response functions indicate that it takes the longest time for arrivals to return to 
normalcy after a shock to the Murder rate, followed by the Assault with Intent to Rob, Rape and 
Residential/Accommodation Burglary rates respectively.  These results are not very surprising as 
the former are violent crimes and will generate significant media coverage.  Such findings are in 
line with those of Altindag (2009); that is, the magnitude of the impact of violent crimes on arrivals 
is greater than that of non-violent crimes.  It is noticeable that the drop-offs in arrivals due to the 
Murder, Assault with Intent to Rob and Rape rates are larger than for the Total Crime rate.  This 
                                               
2 The most parsimonious model is used for estimation.  Hence, only significant terms enter the final equation. 
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may be due to the fact that the Total Crime rate obscures information about more heinous crimes 
and thus does not engender as large a response from tourists. 
As a final step, the direct losses to the tourism economy and indirect losses to the general 
economy from various shock magnitudes were evaluated.  To calculate the direct effect, the drop 
in arrivals for each month (which were obtained from the impulse functions, shown in Figure 2) 
was multiplied by the average expenditure (in USD) per tourist in 2004.  Estimates suggest that a 
1 percent shock to the Total Crime rate results in direct losses of over $47,000.  The indirect losses 
to the general economy tell us for every unit of income generated in the tourism economy, how 
much income is lost in the general economy and is found by multiplying direct losses by the ratio 
multiplier of 2.3.3  Estimated indirect losses are $108,000. Naturally, the direct and indirect income 
losses associated with tourists’ response to each type of crime differ in magnitude as well.  
Estimates suggest that for a 1 percent shock to the Murder rate, the country loses over $2.8 million 
directly and $6.4 million indirectly.  Losses from shocks to the Rape and Assault with Intent to 
Rob rates are also in the millions.   In comparison, losses are $126,000 directly and $290,000 
indirectly from a shock to the Residential/Accommodation Burglary rate.  
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Given the huge potential of the tourist industry and the contribution it is already making to 
economic growth and development of Barbados, the results presented here highlight the need for 
a greater consideration of the impact of crime on tourism.  For example, it was found that indirect 
losses are over twice as large as direct losses.   Most of the direct income from tourism goes to 
hotel and restaurant owners, namely local or international elites (Lejarraja & Walkenhorst, 2007).  
On the other hand, indirect effects trickle down to the lower income strata of the economy.  Any 
shock to crime will thus reduce the livelihood of lower-income producers in a wide array of 
economic sectors.  While it appears that arrivals return to a state of normalcy after a spike in 
criminal activity within approximately 30-61 months, the on-going viability of the sector is likely 
to be contingent on taking a multipronged approach to addressing the domestic crime situation.   
Devising recovery strategies to increase visitation levels that include aggressive marketing 
and promotion efforts can help to overcome the decline in arrivals and associated monetary losses, 
which occur because of heightened criminal activity (Sonmez, Apostolopoulos, & Tarlow, 1999).  
Wahab (1996) also recommends maintaining good contacts with the international press, and 
providing comprehensive information to international tour operators and travel agents.   
Faced with rising crime levels and rates, authorities often respond by committing additional 
resources to combat crime whether or not these expenditures are likely to produce deterrence 
effects.  However, a former Police Commissioner of Barbados, Orville Durant, suggested that 
although deployment of additional security personnel has some short-run benefits, social 
programmes which include the youth, and greater local community participation in the tourism 
sector are necessary to capture even greater benefits of tourism (Durant, 1993). 
Education is another measure to ensure safety of tourists.  Komesar (1973) found that 
victimisation rates for burglary and assault are inversely related to education.  Safety tips 
prominently displayed in arrivals lounges and in hotel rooms and brochures containing warnings 
about locking doors and windows of unattended rooms and vehicles should be mandatory (de 
                                               
3 The ratio multiplier was calculated for Barbados using data from the WTTC.  The method for calculating the ratio 
multiplier is taken from Lejarraja & Walkenhorst (2007). 
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Albuquerque & McElroy, 1999).  Hotel staff can also provide guests with security devices and 
practices to reduce victimisation (Bach & Pizam, 1996), such as electronic room locks and room 
safes.  
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Table 1: Results from Transfer Functions 
 Total 
Crime 
 
Murder 
 
Rape 
 
Assault with 
Intent to Rob  
Accommodation/Residential  
Burglary 
 𝜛?  24,990.33 
(0.000) 
14,354.53 
(0.000) 
16,567.09 
(0.000) 
15,675.61 
(0.000) 
23,023.37 
(0.000) 
a1 0.314 
(0.000) 
0.364 
(0.000) 
0.352 
(0.000) 
0.364 
(0.000) 
0.291 
(0.001) 
a2 0.245 
(0.007) 
0.330 
(0.000) 
0.300 
(0.001) 
0.300 
(0.001) 
0.247 
(0.006) 
c1 --- --- --- -735.090 
(0.075) 
--- 
c2 --- --- -396.894 
(0.099) 
--- --- 
c3 --- --- --- --- -45.923 
(0.002) 
c4 -16.519 
(0.005) 
-681.602 
(0.081) 
--- --- --- 
      
Q(1) 0.130 
(0.718 
0.301 
(0.583) 
0.198 
(0.656) 
0.037 
(0.847) 
0.026 
(0.872) 
Q(12) 4.658 
(0.968) 
6.230 
(0.904) 
7.739 
(0.805) 
8.472 
(0.747) 
4.665 
(0.968) 
Q(24) 14.022 
(0.946) 
13.576 
(0.956) 
18.420 
(0.782) 
18.931 
(0.756) 
18.824 
(0.761) 
Q(36) 17.589 
(0.996) 
18.026 
(0.995) 
22.482 
(0.962) 
22.614 
(0.960) 
22.366 
(0.963) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are p-values.  Q(m) are Q-statistics from lags of the residuals.  
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Table 2: Effects of a One Percent Shock to Various Crime Rates on Tourism 
 Periods before  
Returning to Normalcy 
(months) 
Direct Income 
Losses  
(USD) 
Indirect Income 
Losses  
(USD) 
Total Crime  30 47,000 108,000 
Murder  61 2,817,000 6,479,000 
Rape 48 1,442,000 3,317,000 
Assault with Intent to Rob 51 2,767,000 6,364,000 
Residential/Accommodation Burglary  30 126,000 290,000 
Note:Income losses are in 2004 USD and to the nearest thousand. 
 
